The Foundation Review
Volume 13
Issue 2 Shifting Power in Philanthropy
6-2021

(In)equality Through Unrestricted Grantmaking: Examining Trust
and Power in the Collaboration Between the Dutch Charity
Lotteries and Their Grantees
Olivier Hunnik
Center for Philanthropic Studies at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

Arjen de Wit
Center for Philanthropic Studies at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

Pamala Wiepking
Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy and Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/tfr
Part of the Nonprofit Administration and Management Commons, Public Administration Commons,
Public Affairs Commons, and the Public Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
Hunnik, O., de Wit, A., & Wiepking, P. (2021). (In)equality Through Unrestricted Grantmaking: Examining
Trust and Power in the Collaboration Between the Dutch Charity Lotteries and Their Grantees. The
Foundation Review, 13(2). https://doi.org/10.9707/1944-5660.1563

Copyright © 2021 Dorothy A. Johnson Center for Philanthropy at Grand Valley State University. The Foundation
Review is reproduced electronically by ScholarWorks@GVSU. https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/tfr

doi: 10.9707/1944-5660.1563

Hunnik, De Wit, Wiepking

(In)equality Through Unrestricted
Grantmaking: Examining Trust and Power
in the Collaboration Between the Dutch
Charity Lotteries and Their Grantees
Olivier Hunnik, M.A., and Arjen de Wit, Ph.D., Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; and
Pamala Wiepking, Ph.D., Indiana University and Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Keywords: Unrestricted grantmaking, flexible funding, foundations, collaboration, funder–grantee
relationship, expectations, power

Introduction
Recent developments show a trend among large
foundations toward a model of more flexible,
trust-based, unrestricted funding practices
(Di Mento, 2019). An interesting and relevant
question is how staff at grantee organizations
experience this type of funding. A funder–
grantee relationship is arguably always unequal,
with both visible and invisible power dynamics.
To examine these dynamics, this article provides
an in-depth analysis of the relationship between
the Dutch Charity Lotteries (DCL) — a large
social enterprise providing unrestricted funding
to a wide range of nonprofits — and a sample of
their grantees.

Key Points

Most funding from foundations and governments comes with restrictions on how it should
be spent. An unintended negative consequence
of such restrictions is that they can lead grantee
organizations into the “nonprofit starvation
cycle”: unrealistic expectations about overhead
costs incentivize grantees to prove to potential
funders that they are operating as efficiently as
possible by cutting overhead costs, which reinforces funders’ expectations and can ultimately
threaten organizational survival (Gregory
& Howard, 2009). This cycle has been documented in the United States (Lecy & Searing,
2015) and Germany (Schubert & Boenigk, 2019).
Preliminary analyses covering a limited period
(2007–2017) in the Netherlands do not provide
evidence for declining overhead ratios (Van der
Woude, 2020), and more research is needed to

• Grantee representatives interviewed
for this study stated that openness and
honesty in communication with the Dutch
Charity Lotteries leads to mutual trust, and
that they experience few formal restrictions. Nevertheless, even unrestricted
funding may come with stated or unstated
expectations from the funder, and many
grantees reported that receiving the grant
support leaves them with a sense that they
have to “prove they’re worth it.” Relaxing
formal restrictions gives rise to some
uncertainty about what grantees actually
have to “prove.”

38

• Since 1989, the Dutch Charity Lotteries
have provided multiyear unrestricted
funding, a type of grantmaking that is
fairly unique for the Netherlands, to a
wide range of nonprofits at home and
abroad. This article shares insights into
how unrestricted grantmaking influences
the relationship between funders and
grantees, specifically highlighting how
staff at a sample of grantee organizations
experience collaboration with this large
social enterprise. It discusses hidden and
invisible power dynamics that exist in
the relationship, even when there are few
formal restrictions on grantees’ spending.

• To ensure a more equal collaboration, it is
advisable for foundations to try to detect
and consider expectations that are explicit
and implicit, conscious and unconscious,
and address these. This article offers
suggestions for how foundations can do so.
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document the potential existence of the cycle in
different settings.
Unrestricted grantmaking may break the nonprofit starvation cycle. Altschuler & Tirona
(2019) argue that unrestricted funding increases
the flexibility of nonprofit organizations, allowing them to respond better to opportunities and
challenges. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
such practices improve grantees’ organizational
and project impact (Wallace & Saxton, 2018).
Riemer, Frank, Rubin, and Merrow-Kehoe (2017)
conclude that grantees of a community foundation in Connecticut were “better able to achieve
their mission,” making progress in “accomplishing strategic plan goals [and] strengthening
and/or sustaining their infrastructures,” and
have been nimble and flexible in carrying out
strategic plans in “the face of unpredictable
operating environments” (pp. 34–35). Chikoto
and Neely (2014) and Eckhart-Queenan, Etzel,
and Silverman (2019) suggest that unrestricted
funding strengthens nonprofits, because it can
be a powerful tool to solve the chronic problem
of underfunding.
The Dutch Charity Lotteries
Since 1989, the Dutch Charity Lotteries (Goede
Doelen Loterijen) — comprising Vrienden
Loterij (Friends Lottery), Nationale Postcode
Loterij (Dutch Postcode Lottery), and the
BankGiro Loterij (BankGiro Lottery) — have
provided funding to nonprofits primarily in the
Netherlands, but also abroad. In total, the lotteries employ over 400 people and support more
than 100 nonprofits in the areas of social issues,
environment, health and well-being, and arts
and culture (BankGiro Loterij, 2021).
The Dutch Charity Lotteries (DCL) operate
with three permits in the Dutch lottery market.
All the lotteries in the Netherlands are, since
January 2020, obliged to grant 40% of their revenue to societal causes. There are two exceptions,
the State Lottery and the Lotto, which are run

Since 1989, the Dutch Charity
Lotteries (Goede Doelen
Loterijen) — comprising
Vrienden Loterij (Friends
Lottery), Nationale Postcode
Loterij (Dutch Postcode
Lottery), and the BankGiro
Loterij (BankGiro Lottery)
— have provided funding to
nonprofits primarily in the
Netherlands, but also abroad.
by the Dutch government and grant 15% and
18%, respectively, of their revenue to societal
causes (Nationale Postcode Loterij, 2021). The
DCL states that their grants must support innovative, green, and social projects, in line with
their overarching objectives and mission for a
healthy civil society. The largest share of grants
goes to organizations in the fields of international development and environment through
the Postcode Lottery, while smaller amounts
are allocated to social and health-related projects (Friends Lottery) and culture (BankGiro
Lottery).1 In 2018, the DCL donated 511 million
euros (approximately $614 million) to nonprofit
organizations. The overarching company
Novamedia — which also runs smaller Postcode
Lotteries in Sweden, the UK, Germany and
Norway — is placed among the largest private
donors in the world (City A.M., 2020).
To qualify as a possible grantee, organizations
must fulfill some basic requirements, including having a minimum amount of their own
fundraising income, at least a national outreach,
and standing as a professional and typically

1 This

article focuses on nonprofits that receive funding from the Dutch Postcode Lottery and Friends Lottery. The Postcode
Lottery typically makes grants of at least 500,000 euros and a maximum of 22.5 million euros per year, for at least five years.
The Friends Lottery provides smaller unrestricted grants, ranging from approximately 3,000 to 3 million euros per year,
typically for five years. In addition, the Friends Lottery allows grantees to sell their own tickets through their lottery, with
profits going directly to the grantee.
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The DCL describes their grants
as “unrestricted, long-term,
and based on trust” — an
interesting point, because
unrestricted funding might
also contribute by helping to
equalize the power relationship
between funder and grantee.
certified organization, and they must work in
one of the sectors that the DCL supports. The
DCL’s annual grantmaking process involves
four steps:
1. The Charities Department, which is also
responsible for maintaining relations with
grantees and monitoring their evaluations,
makes a first selection on the eligibility of
applications.
2. The Charities Department and the board of
directors make a long list of possible grantees.
3. The board of directors decides on the final
selection.
4. The supervisory board approves the selection.
Power and Unrestricted Funding
The DCL describes their grants as “unrestricted,
long-term, and based on trust” (Goede Doelen
Loterijen, 2019, p. 2) — an interesting point,
because unrestricted funding might also contribute by helping to equalize the power relationship
between funder and grantee. Based on the
resource dependency theory and principal-agent
theory, Froelich (1999) and Van Puyvelde, Caers,
Du Bois, and Jegers (2012) argue that a funder–
grantee relationship is based on an unequal
power relationship. Funders (the “principals”)
have the resources on which nonprofits (the
“agents”) depend. If funders set requirements or
conditions for their investments, nonprofits will
40

try to meet them, even if this conflicts with their
mission and operations.
However, power is a complicated concept.
Gaventa (2006) defines three forms of power:
1. Visible power can be defined as the visible
and definable forms of power within a collaboration; examples are formal agreements,
structures, and authorities.
2. Hidden power is held by the ones with power:
those deciding who is involved with making important decisions and what is on the
agenda.
3. Invisible power, the final form, can be
described as the psychological and ideological
boundaries of power.
Invisible power connects with Foucault’s (1978)
perspective on power: it may reside in discourses
and in being “observed.” As people in today’s
postmodern society are increasingly focused
on enhancing their individual well-being, they
have lost sight of those who “observe” (Bauman,
2000; Rossi, 2004). As a result, power has become
invisible and elusive, or, from a Foucauldian perspective, internalized and normalized. Foucault
therefore states that power exists in discourses:
in language, in the actions of people, and in
the interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile
relationships. While the relationship between
actors with power (on the side of the funder)
and without power (on the recipient side) may
appear more equal in unrestricted grantmaking,
one might question whether power is actually
being exercised in a more subtle, less visible, and
maybe even unintentional way.
Given that most assessments, evaluations, and
reports are to gauge grantee performance, our
research aims to identify how DCL grantees
experience the funder–grantee relationship
— with a look at trust and power and their
impact on the efforts being executed. We will
specifically examine the role of unrestricted,
long-term grantmaking, as well as the explicit
and implicit expectations of both the DCL and
those grantees. The scope of the current study
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TABLE 1 Organizations and Information
Organization

Interviewee(s)

Sector

Role in
Organization

DCL
Beneficiary

Income From
DCL/Total

Health
Organization 1

Relationship
manager
(Two interviews)

Health

Innovator

15-19 years

0-25%

Health
Organization 2

Director

Health

Innovator

10-14 years

50-75%

Health
Organization 3

• Marketer
• Financial
employee

Health

Advocacy and
spokespeople

15-19 years

0-25%

Health
Organization 4

Account
manager

Health

Service
provision

0-4 years

0-25%

Environmental
Organization 1

• Director
• Relationship
manager

Environment

Innovator

5-9 years

0-25%

Environmental
Organization 2

Director

Environment

Innovator

0-4 years

0-25%

Environmental
Organization 3

Director

Environment

Agitator and
maverick

10-14 years

25-50%

Environmental
Organization 4

Account
manager

Environment

Advocacy and
spokespeople

>20 years

0-25%

Human Rights
Organization 1

Connecting
officer

International
and human rights

Advocacy and
spokespeople

0-4 years

0-25%

Human Rights
Organization 2

Director

International
and human rights

Innovator

5-9 years

0-25%

Human Rights
Organization 3

Director

International
and human rights

Service
provision

>20 years

0-25%

Societal
Organization

Vice president

Societal and
social causes

Service
provision

5-9 years

0-25%

Dutch Postcode
Lottery

Relationship
manager 1

Funder

Dutch Postcode
Lottery

Relationship
manager 2

Funder

does not entail the consequences of unrestricted
grantmaking for the actual work of the organizations, which is discussed elsewhere (Wiepking
& De Wit, 2020).
Our results can help both funders and grantees
rethink their relationships and the partially
implicit and unintentional power relationships
they characterize. The suggestions that follow

from our results may contribute to ways of
engaging and collaborating that are constructive
for both funders and grantees.
Research Design
Given that the DCL provides grants to over 100
nonprofits, we used maximum variation sampling to select a variety of grantee organizations
to be interviewed.2 We invited grantees of the

2 When

COVID-19 struck, six planned interviews were delayed or canceled. The sample does not represent the whole
population of nonprofits collaborating with the DCL, but it reached a saturation point after 13 interviews. Nine were
conducted in the first two weeks before the pandemic hit the Netherlands, and four after the impact became clearer.
Questions were asked of those four respondents about how their organizations were dealing with the pandemic and how
flexible funding impacted their work amid a global health crisis. Those respondents indicated that unrestricted funding
allowed them to shift priorities to address the most urgent needs.
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Two main themes emerged
from the analysis: (1) the role
of trust and power in the
collaboration between the
DCL and their grantees; and
(2) the explicit and implicit
expectations of both the DCL
and the grantees.

Dutch Postcode Lottery and the Friends Lottery
in the sectors of health, the environment,
societal and social causes, and international
and human rights, and across organizational
roles — “service provision,” “advocacy and
spokespeople,” “innovator,” and “agitator
and maverick” — derived from Robert Bosch
Stiftung (Roland Berger Strategy Consultants,
2014, pp. 40–41). (See Table 1.)
We conducted and analyzed 15 semistructured
interviews: 13 with representatives of 12 nonprofit organizations and two with relationship
managers of the Dutch Postcode Lottery. (See
Table 1.) All interviews were coded using two
coding cycles. In the primary coding cycle, we
used both descriptive and in vivo codes to analyze the first seven interview transcripts. In the
secondary coding cycle, we coded axially. The
final codes were used to analyze the last eight
transcripts.
Two main themes emerged from the analysis: (1)
the role of trust and power in the collaboration
between the DCL and their grantees; and (2) the
explicit and implicit expectations of both the
DCL and the grantees.
The Role of Trust and Power
in the Collaboration
When asked to characterize the collaboration
with the DCL, the representatives of the grantee
organizations described it as “transparent,”
“honest,” “trustful,” and “communicative.” In
42

discussing the evaluation of the collaboration,
the director of one of the human rights organizations said:
I honestly expected that it would be a formal conversation with an agenda and where we would be
critically questioned. Well, for us, I can say that
… we had a very pleasant and open conversation
about what is going well, what is going not so
well, what we can still develop. They also asked
about our impact, how we want to do it. So, I
found it a very open, informal conversation where
we could exchange information with each other.
And constructive instead of critical.

Another characteristic of the relationship mentioned most frequently by the respondents
is “trust.” The trust within the relationship
described by the respondents has two layers.
First, they say that the DCL trusts the grantees’
expertise; as an account manager for one of
the environmental nonprofits phrased it, the
DCL considers the nonprofit organizations the
“expert in their field.” The second layer of trust
comes from the DCL’s low level of monitoring.
The DCL does not interfere with the operations
of the nonprofits; when it comes to spending
decisions, the unrestricted funding really is
unrestricted. Also, evaluations are infrequent:
generally, once a year.
The transparency in the collaboration is
described by the respondents as “open communication.” The contact takes place in different
ways and on different levels, from face-to-face
contact to email, and DCL relationship managers talk with directors of the grantees and vice
versa. All forms of contact are often described
as “informal” — personal and characterized by
a pleasant atmosphere. However, the contact is
also described by some respondents as “businesslike”: it is, and always will be, a relationship
based on agreements. An account manager for
one of the health-related grantees described
the relationship with the Friends Lottery as
“extremely fruitful”:
Look, [the Friends Lottery] is just a party that of
course involves charities which they think are
doing something good for society, etc., but also the
ones that are easy to market, in the end that can

The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org
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contribute to more [lottery] tickets being sold. …
With the Friends Lottery, the collaboration is very
interesting. You can make things big, think big.
… You can go from small wishes you organize for
one client to a large recruitment drive where you
try to recruit, I don’t know, tens of thousands of
new participants. And everything in between. And
that’s good.

As illustrated here, the collaboration is more
than just a funder–grantee relationship. The
collaboration can be used for other goals, generating brand awareness for the DCL through the
“goodwill” of nonprofits, or using each other’s
network to connect and collaborate with other
organizations.
Equality: Objective Versus Subjective
The second and most interesting (potential)
barrier is the equality within the collaboration
between the DCL and their grantees. We left
the interpretation of the term “equality” up to
the respondents because we wanted to see if
different respondents would interpret this term
differently. When asked if their relationship with
the DCL can be defined as equal, all respondents
said “no.” The answers and interpretations of
the respondents can be divided in two forms
of equality: “objective equality” and “subjective equality.” In terms of objective equality,
12 respondents mentioned that they are, to a
smaller or larger extent, dependent on DCL
funding. The account manager for the health
grantee remarked,
No, there’s never an equal relationship. No.
Because they are the ones with the big money that
support us. So if you look purely at the collaboration, it’s never an equal relationship. But I don’t
have the feeling that they are Big Brother telling us
what to do. … Is there equality between a mother
and her child? No. But it’s a healthy relationship.

And this is where the second form, subjective
equality, emerges. Almost all respondents say
that they experience the collaboration as equal,
mostly because of the open and trustful nature
of the collaboration. This experience of equality
allows the respondents to, for example, say “no”
to requests of the DCL. The account manager
for the environmental grantee explained,

[T]he collaboration is more
than just a funder–grantee
relationship. The collaboration
can be used for other goals,
generating brand awareness
for the DCL through the
“goodwill” of nonprofits, or
using each other’s network to
connect and collaborate with
other organizations.

If [the request] is achievable, we do it. … If it
doesn’t work, I also say that. And [the DCL] also
accept that. In that sense, it doesn’t feel like that
you always have to say “yes.” If we cannot do it,
then we can be honest, which is also fine.
Mutual Dependency

To deepen the subjective experience of equality,
we provoked respondents by stating in the interviews, “without charities, no Charity Lotteries.”
Not everyone acknowledged this statement, but
11 respondents did. One of them, the director of
an environmental organization, said,
Yeah, it’s a tricky subject, because … the one who
pays has power. But sometimes it gets overestimated, because the funder does not always have
an idea. And I think that what’s happening is some
kind of interplay, a balance …. We have the idea, a
knowledge network, and we are the ones executing
it. And you have the funder, the DCL, who have
interests in the idea being executed well, because
they think it’s a good idea. In that sense, you can
state it pretty straightforwardly: The idea is worth
money, and the network we have is also worth
money, and [the DCL] has to pay for that. If you
keep it that simple, then it’s a beautiful exchange.

“The idea” that the director talks about is the
network and the projects of the organization,
with which the DCL can increase their legitimacy by associating themselves with the
The Foundation Review // Vol 13:2
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“goodwill” of their charity. Therefore, the most
cited characteristic of “the idea” is the ability
to generate brand awareness for the DCL. We
call this subjective experience of equality and
dependency the “mutual dependency” within
the collaboration. From the interviews it became
clear that if respondents were aware of the
reciprocity within the collaboration, they experienced the power distribution at the subjective
level as more equal. As a result, how the objective, unequal power distribution is dealt with
differs for each individual: if someone is aware
of the reciprocity, transparency, and trust within
the collaboration, that person experiences more
room to maneuver.
Explicit and Implicit Expectations
The second theme of the results focuses on the
expectations within the collaboration. At the
start of the collaboration with the DCL, the
nonprofit signs a contract. In the interviews with
the DCL relationship managers, we asked what
agreements can be found in such contracts. At
first, they said that the agreements are not that
extensive, meaning that not much is mentioned
apart from subjects like evaluation, payments,
and marketing. Said one, “If other funders are
mentioned [in marketing campaigns], we also
want to be mentioned.” These agreements are
in line with what the respondents from the
nonprofits had to say about the contracts.

• Increase effectiveness.
• Initiate a snowball effect.
Most respondents said that they did not know
about these objectives before our interviews,
but do recognize the objectives as characterizing their collaboration with the DCL. How
strongly the objectives apply differs from one
organization to another. One respondent stated
that independence and innovation are the most
recognizable effect for their organization; for
other interviewees, all five objectives were
important; there were even two respondents
who regarded none of these objectives as relevant for their organization. In answer to our
question about whether the objectives are realistic and achievable, one respondent said you will
never achieve everything for all objectives —
something other respondents agreed upon.
Expectations of the DCL
Relationship Managers

We also asked the DCL relationship managers
about their expectations of the collaboration
with the grantees. In addition to the agreements
stipulated in the contract, they stated transparency and timely reporting are expected. These
are “unwritten explicit expectations”: not stated
in the contract, but discussed as part of the collaboration. To identify further expectations, we
asked the relationship managers to describe the
“ideal grantee.” One of them said,

Explicit Expectations

In researching the expectations within the relationship between the DCL and their grantees,
we used five goals for their unrestricted and
long-term support that the DCL mentions in
some of their communications (Goede Doelen
Loterijen, 2019). These goals are not formal
requirements for each grantee, but instead
reflect the way in which the DCL describes their
general goals for improving civil society:
• Strengthen effectiveness.
• Stimulate innovation and risk taking.
• Guarantee independence.
44

The ideal grantee just does good work [laughs]. I
think the ideal grantee is a kind of partner. It’s like
a marriage, right? So the grantee challenges you
now and then. They make you aware of things and
finish their homework on time …, and also take
you on an adventure, maybe. You know? That you
try things together, financing innovations you’d
never thought would be possible.

Parts of this quote directly relate to perceptions
of grantees. “Finishing their homework on
time” can be linked to the timely submission
of reports. The challenge in the collaboration can be linked to the intention that the
nonprofits continue to innovate and take
risks. Strengthening each other’s brand — the

The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org
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marketing — can be found in the “adventure.”
In this respect, the expectations of the collaboration partners are at the same level.
However, one key result from the interviews
is that it is unclear where meeting the explicit
expectations ends: When is the DCL mentioned
enough in marketing campaigns? When has
enough innovation been shown? When do you
“finish your homework on time”? We asked the
relationship managers what was not stated in
the contract but was nevertheless important for
the collaboration. “There’s a lot which isn’t mentioned in the agreement,” one responded.
How should grantees deal with the fact that
“there’s a lot” which is not explicitly mentioned
in the collaboration contract? This probably
affects the funder–grantee relationship, and has
an effect on the agreements, expectations, and
objectives within the relationship. The freedom
of unrestricted funding may cause expectations
within the collaboration to become vague —
blurring the line between explicit and implicit
expectations. By “implicit expectations,” we
mean the expectations within the relationship
that are not written in formal agreements and
are not discussed.
When we asked the DCL relationship managers why collaboration with a grantee might be
ended, one replied that they “decide whether
an organization is still socially relevant.” It also
emerged later in the interview that another
reason for terminating the relationship could be
when a grantee is given the opportunity to participate in a campaign but refuses to do so and
“there are a hundred other nonprofit organizations willing to participate.” These trade-offs are
conscious thought processes for the DCL, but
our research does not show whether the grantees are also aware of this.
Implicit Expectations:
Conscious and Unconscious

In the interviews, we asked the respondents
whether they experience implicit expectations
as part of the collaboration. Most respondents
said there were none, or that they were not
aware of any. Two respondents were aware of

The freedom of unrestricted
funding may cause
expectations within the
collaboration to become
vague — blurring the line
between explicit and implicit
expectations. By “implicit
expectations,” we mean
the expectations within the
relationship that are not
written in formal agreements
and are not discussed.

implicit expectations: the director of the societal
organization claiming that the DCL wants to
facilitate a “political counterforce” (as a result
of the DCL’s objectives); the director of one of
the human rights nonprofits stating that the
DCL expects their grantees to “keep innovating
and not slow down.” But, as the conversation
about the different expectations went on, more
interviewees unconsciously mentioned implicit
expectations. The most important was that
grantees must continuously “prove their worth”
in the collaboration.
Proving Your Worth

The collaboration between the DCL and the
grantee organizations is described as “unique.”
Besides the unrestricted nature of the grants,
another aspect to consider here is the reputation
of the DCL in the Dutch philanthropic sector.
Although the DCL is sometimes criticized in the
public debate — mostly relating to the selection
of grantees — the DCL’s grants are typically
considered prestigious. They are announced at
a gala which has no equal in the Netherlands in
terms of size and splendor. “It’s a club that does
something enormous,” according to the director
of an environmental organization. Another said:
The Foundation Review // Vol 13:2
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From our analyses it becomes
clear that the funder–grantee
collaboration between the
DCL and their grantees is
characterized by transparency
and trust. Our respondents
stated that openness and
honesty in the communication
from the DCL builds mutual
trust.

They’re sort of the Champions League. … [You
are] kind of elected, you are their grantee; and
from there comes a lot of appreciation and also
a lot of a sense of responsibility, like … we must
spend the [funds] the right way.

These observations relate to the implicit
expectation that the organizations must prove
themselves to be worthy of the collaboration.
There is a “sense of responsibility” to spend the
money correctly. “If the Friends Lottery asks me
something, then we release a press statement or
a photo,” the director of a health nonprofit said.
“Look, they have priorities. If I compare it with
something else, then I’m willing to take that
extra step to get it done.”
Here, that grantee is willing to take “that extra
step” to get things done for the DCL. But not
every respondent agreed with the statement that
they need to prove themselves to the DCL. Four
respondents did not find it difficult to say “no”
to marketing requests from the DCL, because
of the transparent and trusting nature of the
collaboration. Therefore, how people experience the implicit expectation of proving their
worth depends on three factors: their personal
interpretation of the nature of the collaboration; their experience of dependency on the
DCL grants; and the sense of responsibility to
ensure the funds are spent in the “correct” way,
46

sometimes keeping the nonformal goals of the
DCL in mind.
Theoretical Interpretation
From our analyses it becomes clear that the
funder–grantee collaboration between the DCL
and their grantees is characterized by transparency and trust. Our respondents stated that
openness and honesty in the communication
from the DCL builds mutual trust. This is in
line with the definition of an integrative collaboration (Austin, 2000): a high level of mutual
resources and concern, and honest, open, efficient, effective, and frequent communication.
The DCL explicitly states that the collaboration
with their grantees is based on trust and partnership, incorporating multiple moments of
formal communication, such as evaluations, and
of informal communication during events such
as charity galas, for example (Goede Doelen
Loterijen, 2019).
In line with principal-agent theory (Van
Puyvelde et al., 2012), the collaboration between
the DCL and their grantees is objectively
unequal. However, because the respondents
experience a high level of trust and mutual
dependency within the collaboration, grantees experience the power dynamics as more
equal. This subjective equality is in line with
Ganesan and Hess (1997), who state that trust
(in researching the relationship between a buyer
and a seller) is built on two aspects: credibility and benevolence. Credibility is based on
the intention and ability of the collaborating
partners to keep promises and commitments.
In addition, various characteristics of the collaboration partners, such as competencies
and reliability, can influence these aspects.
The second aspect, benevolence, is based
on the attributed qualities, intentions, and
characteristics of the collaborating partners,
showing genuine concern for the partner. The
interinstitutional trust (the DCL’s vulnerability engendered by placing responsibility for
spending the money on the charities, and the
credibility the charities radiate toward the DCL)
and the interpersonal trust (the mutual transparency) between the DCL and their grantees lead
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to the balance of power being experienced as
equal (Austin, 2000; Ganesan & Hess, 1997).
Personality seems to play a role in the relationship, but it is an open question whether
respondents would be able to say “no” if the
structures of the relationship were different.
Social interactions are structured by formal and
informal norms (Nee & Ingram, 1998). In this
case, the few accountability requirements are
formal norms, while informal norms include
the relaxed atmosphere in social interactions.
Respondents feel that they can ask for help when
needed, be open about organizational choices,
and have personal conversations during meetings; these are all informal norms that structure
social relations and contribute to an open and
trusting relationship. As such, our interviews
show that power dynamics depend on both
interpersonal and interinstitutional aspects.
Power

Another insight that emerges from our analyses is that there are implicit expectations in
the collaboration. These can be divided into
conscious and unconscious expectations. When
we relate this to Gaventa’s (2006) three forms of
power, the first, visible power, can be defined
as the explicit expectations in the collaboration.
The second, hidden power, is held by the DCL:
they decide which grantees they want to work
with. The question of whether a grantee is still
“socially relevant” is an example of how this
level of power works: the DCL decides, without
direct involvement of the grantees.
Gaventa’s final form of power is invisible power,
which can be described as the psychological and
ideological boundaries of power (Foucault, 1978;
Gaventa, 2006). The unconscious implicit expectation among representatives of the grantees
that they have to prove themselves to the DCL
can be interpreted as an example of invisible
power. Two factors are important here. First, the
uniqueness of and dependence on unrestricted,
multiyear funding, as well as the DCL’s reputation as a highly regarded actor in the Dutch
philanthropic sector, increases the respondents’
sense of responsibility to maintain the collaboration. To do this, they will increasingly have

Another insight that emerges
from our analyses is that there
are implicit expectations in
the collaboration. These can
be divided into conscious and
unconscious expectations.
to demonstrate to the DCL that they work efficiently and effectively, competing with other
nonprofit organizations (Lecy & Searing, 2015).
Even if respondents are reluctant to express
this in the interviews, there will always be
unconscious competition among nonprofits. If
they want to distinguish themselves from other
organizations, they will have to demonstrate
to the DCL their worth: for every grantee, as a
relationship manager observed, there are a hundred others.
Second, there is uncertainty about the DCL’s
objectives. Grantees must “continue to innovate,” as one respondent stated, but it is unclear
to what extent they should innovate, and what
other objectives grantees should meet with the
DCL funding. For example, the lack of clarity
about the status of the DCL’s nonformal goals as
specified in a brochure (Goede Doelen Loterijen,
2019) confronts grantees with a gray area in
which they feel that they have to prove their
worth, but are not certain what it is they have to
prove and how they can best do this.
How do grantees cope with this uncertainty?
Besides interpersonal relations, there may be
institutional dynamics that play a role. Oliver
(1991) distinguishes five types of organizational response to external pressure: acquiesce,
compromise, avoid, defy, or manipulate. We
recognize acquiescence in our data, with grantees complying with the expectations and even
proactively acting in line with them — for
example, by mentioning the funder’s name in
communications. Avoidance also occurs, when
respondents seem to ignore whatever the funder
thinks of them, but active defiance does not
The Foundation Review // Vol 13:2
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Our research shows that
building equal and trust-based
relationships is not an easy
endeavor. Funders should
be aware of the complex
power dynamics in their
collaborations. A funder is
typically most powerful in
terms of financial resources,
but grantee organizations
possess different kinds of
resources.
seem a strategy used by the grantees we interviewed. Objectives can also be compromised or
even manipulated: the DCL’s objectives are fairly
broad, and how they work out in practice might
depend on the grantee. How organizations
“innovate” or “snowball” strongly depends on
the values and mission of the organization.
“The Idea” as Symbolic Capital

There is one factor that counters this unequally
distributed power relationship between the
DCL and their grantees: mutual dependency. As
the director of the environmental nonprofit said,
the DCL essentially pays their grantees for their
“idea,” referring to the knowledge (the network
and projects) of the grantees that the DCL does
not have. Therefore, the DCL and their grantees
are dependent on each other: the grantee on the
funding, and the DCL on the “idea,” with which
it can generate brand awareness so it can sell
lottery tickets. Sales revenue is what the DCL
needs to achieve its vision: improving civil society (Goede Doelen Loterijen, 2019). Essentially,
while the funder possesses economic capital,
it can be argued that the grantee brings the
“symbolic capital” on which the DCL’s lottery
tickets sales rely (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 2013;
see also Bocquet, Cotterlaz-Rannard, & Ferrary,
48

2020). Given this distribution of different types
of resources, some hidden power can also be
situated at the grantee organizations. Hence,
both the DCL and the nonprofits have invisible power in the collaboration, emphasizing
the need for transparent communication and
mutual trust to acknowledge this distribution of
power (Austin, 2000).
Discussion and Conclusion
Unrestricted funding may have several benefits, including less bureaucracy, greater
flexibility to react to changing circumstances,
more financial security, more room to build
a strong organization, and increased autonomy (Wiepking & De Wit, 2020). Unrestricted
funding is often one of the instruments used in
“trust-based philanthropy.” Yet there is more
to trust-based philanthropy than just relaxing
formal grant restrictions. Trust-based philanthropy is described as “an approach to giving
that addresses the inherent power imbalances
between funders, nonprofits, and the communities they serve,” which includes “multi-year
unrestricted giving, streamlined applications
and reporting, and a commitment to building
relationships based on transparency, dialogue,
and mutual learning” (Trust-Based Philanthropy
Project, 2021, p. 1).
Our research shows that building equal and
trust-based relationships is not an easy endeavor.
Funders should be aware of the complex power
dynamics in their collaborations. A funder is
typically most powerful in terms of financial
resources, but grantee organizations possess
different kinds of resources. Without their
work, the donor has nothing to fund. This gives
grantees power, but it can also lead to expectations regarding, for example, brand awareness.
Mission drift is often mentioned as a possible
effect of restricted funding, but can also occur
when beneficiaries feel they need to develop
attractive projects that do well in marketing
campaigns.
The case of the Dutch Charity Lotteries is
salient because they combine a low level of formal agreement and high levels of trust in their
grantees with a broad vision of the civil society

The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

(In)equality Through Unrestricted Grantmaking

they want to contribute to. At the same time,
it is a large social enterprise, and its primary
purpose is selling lottery tickets, for which it
highlights the work of beneficiaries in marketing
campaigns. On the one hand, because of these
unique characteristics, we have to be careful in
generalizing these findings to other contexts.
We do believe the relationship between the DCL
and its grantees provides an excellent case study
of power dynamics in trust-based grantmaking.
Power can be visible, hidden, or invisible. To
achieve more equal collaboration, it is advisable
for foundations to try to detect and consider
the expectations that are explicit and implicit,
conscious and unconscious. Even unrestricted
funding may come with expectations, hidden
or unhidden, on the part of the funder, and
many grantees will feel that they have to “prove
they’re worth it.” Relaxing formal restrictions
may give rise to a gray area in which there is
uncertainty about what grantee organizations
actually have to prove.
Broadly speaking, funders can adopt three
strategies to handle explicit and implicit
expectations. First, they can choose to clearly
communicate their overall goals, so that beneficiaries know better what is expected from
them. This seems suitable for foundations with
a clearly defined vision, mission, and theory of
change. A second possible strategy would be the
opposite. A large grantmaking organization like
the DCL, which funds different types of organizations in different sectors, could try to abandon
all expectations and let beneficiaries freely
decide what to do with their grants. However,
as we have shown, full absence of expectations

seems impossible. A third strategy is to adopt a
somewhat flexible approach, and to constantly
redefine the purpose of the grants in close
cooperation with the beneficiaries. This suits
the ideals behind trust-based grantmaking, in
which funder and grantee try to establish equal
relationships and where the grantee is taken
seriously as the expert in the field. This requires
more than unrestricted funding, and may ask
from funders a type of self-reflection which may
be inconvenient but necessary to ensure a level
playing field (Wong & McGrath, 2020).
Not all our respondents were equally aware of
the mutual dependency we described in this article. Interpersonal relations, the duration of the
collaboration, and the type of nonprofit activities may all play a role in the extent to which
subjective equality is recognized. When there is
awareness of the different types of resources that
both sides bring to the table, funders and grantees can create the relationship that is needed to
work toward a truly integrative collaboration
based on mutual dependency and trust.
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